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After a period of over 15 years of relative price stability, the general 
price level began to rise rapidly in Mexico during the last quarter of 1972, 
reaching approximately 70 per cent by 1982. The paper addresses itself 
to three main questions: (i) What role did accelerated government expen-
ditures play in increasing inflationary pressures? (2) To what extent was 
the recent inflation Imported rather than domestically induced? (3) Did 
the underlying mechanism of inflation change during this period so that 
the inflation experience in the mid- to late 1970s became fundamentally 
different from that experienced in prior periods? Taken in their entirety, 
the empirical results developed in the paper cast doubt on the role of 
pure coat push facton as a significant contributing factor to Mexico's 
infiation during the period under consideration. On the other hand, the 
structuralist interpretation of inflation appears to be on much sounder 
ground. A number of problems do remain, however, in tenns of opera-
tionallzing the main arguments of the structuralist thesis for the Mexican 
context. 
INTRODUCTION 
After a period of over 15 years of relative price stability, 
the general price level in Mexico began to rise rapidly in the 
last quarter of 1972, reaching approximately 30 per cent by 
1980. Explanations for the end of price stability are many: 
1) the government's inattentiveness to structural problems, permit-
ting them to intensify and finally surface; 
2) the government's over-reaction to the economic slowdown of 
1971 with vastly expanded monetary and fiscal policies; 
3) the effect of world inflation on Mexican prices through more ex-
pensive imports, particularly foodstuffs; 
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4) the government's import substitution policy that encouraged in-
efficient, high cost production; and 
5) the Echeverria administration's attempt at social reform with a 
high level of economic growth, resulting in large government 
deficits and severe debt service payments. 
A number of other sources are, of course, logically 
possible [Griffiths 12, p.3] and at least not inconsistent with 
the country's overall economic patterns of growth and in-
flation. 
Three main questions are addressed. First, what role 
did accelerated government expenditures play in increasing 
inflationary pressures? Second, to what extent was the 
recent inflation imported rather than domestically induced? 
Finally, did the underlying mechanism of inflation change 
during this period so that the inflation experience in the mid-
1970s was fundamentally different from that in previous 
periods? 
It should be noted that thi& article does not examine 
in detail the post-1980 inflation in Mexico. Price increases 
during the 1980-84 period hav·e been especially severe, 
reaching nearly 100 per cent per annum in 1982 and 1983. 
The acceleration in inflation after 1980 is clearly related 
to oil based expenditures and, therefore, differs somewhat 
from the 19 51-1980 period covered in the analysis presented 
below. More precisely, in 1979 public investment expanded 
by 18 per cent in real terms and private investment, partly 
stimulated by this increase, rose at a similar rate. In 1980, 
the rates of growth were 17 and 15 per cent respectively. 
Internal spending, however, increased without generating 
sufficient domestic savings. As a result, the country current-
ly suffers from a Keynesian inflationary gap [Urquidi 24, 
p.80]. In addition, the public sector deficit rose to about 
16 per cent of GDP in 1982, clearly beyond a reasonable 
level. Further, during the post-1980 period, some sectors of 
the Mexican population have been spending at maximum 
rates. Consumption expenditures as a whole rose at about 
5 per cent per year in real terms ovei; the 1980-1983 period. 
Those who receive additional income from the oil sec-
tor, or other groups enjoying a certain prosperity like the 
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privileged blue and white collar workers, the professional 
and technical middle class, the intermediary groups (mainly 
in wholesale and retail trade) and other high income groups 
that have benefitted from this whole process, have simply 
spent more. 
The recent inflation has also encouraged anticipatory 
spending and has discouraged current savings. Through most 
of 1982 and into 1983, high interest rates from 30 to 40 per 
cent for bank borrowers have negatively affected small 
industry and created problems for agriculture and housing. 
In addition, the high interest rates have tended to fuel the 
inflationary process, and generated expectations that further 
accelerated inflation. In short, the acceleration in inflation 
experienced in the last several years (1980-84) in Mexico 
should be looked at as a set of oil related, demand forces 
superimposed on the structural conditions identified in the 
main body of the article. 
RECENT INF LA TIO NARY PATIERNS 
The actual record shows an average rate of real growth 
per annum in 1973-76 of 4.9 per cent, compared with an 
average of 6.4 per cent for the preceding six years of sta-
bility. The latter included a year ( 1971) of severe austerity 
with a low growth rate of 3.4 per cent resulting from a re-
duction in the rate of public investment by over 23 per cent 
in its attempt to dampen the rising inflation. 
During 1975, the government attempted to deal with 
inflation again, and it is possible that this was partly respon-
sible for the fall in the rate of growth to 4.1 per cent. In 
1977, the additional petroleum and derivatives in GDP in-
creased from 3.6 per cent in 1973 to 5.0 per cent in 1977 
and to 6.3 per cent in 1980. From 1977 to date, the new oil 
resources have added, directly or indirectly, possibly two 
percentage points to the rate of growth in GDP. Even with 
this lifting of the trend line, however, the average growth in 
the first four years of the Lopez Portillo administration was 
. 
only 6.4 per cent, the same as for 1967-1972 [Bath 5, pp. 
198-99]. 
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In terms of overall patterns, prices were clearly more 
stable in 1960-1970 than in the 1980s. Prices were also more 
stable relating to international prices and to U.S. prices 
during the 1960-1970 period. 
The conclusion on wages is more difficult to draw. 
Nominal urban minimum wages grew by 268 per cent be-
tween 1970 and 1978, and the increase in real terms was 
18.8 per cent deflating by the national consumer price index, 
and 18.4 per cent deflating by the special consumer price 
index for low income families. Real wages in manufacturing 
industry rose by similar amounts. 
It should be noted that in periods of high inflation, 
the annual changes in real wages fluctuate widely. Deflated 
by the national consumer price index, the real urban mini-
mum ( 1971-78) shows four annual declines ranging from 
-0.9 per cent to -66.2 per cent, and four annual increases 
ranging from 0.9 per cent to 12. 7 per cent. In the same per-
iod, manufacturing wages were more stable ranging from a 
decline of -3.1 per cent in 1978 to increases of 0.3 per cent 
to 9.0 per cent in the other seven years. 
Sorting out the relative importance of these and other 
potential causes of inflation is a difficult task, but a necess-
ary one since: (i) inflationary forces appear to be gathering 
strength; (ii) the productive expenditure of petroleum earn-
ings will likely fuel excessive demand; and (iii) further spen-
ding will run afoul of severe supply inelasticities and/or 
bottlenecks. 
For their part, Mexican authorities appear - after the 
failures of 1971 and 1975 - unwilling to risk impairing the 
rate of economic expansion as a means of controlling infla-
tion. President Lopez Portillo has noted on numerous occa-
sions that the government must not reduce inflation by de-
celerating investment spending or general demand. As late 
as September 1980 and in the face of 30 per cent inflation, 
the President outlined various anti-inflationary measures 
in his Fourth State of the Nation I.leport, making it clear 
that any conflicts between inflation and growth would be 
decided in favour of growth. 
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It is fair to say, however, that the ability of the Mexi-
can government to come to grips with the nation's recent 
inflationary build-up will be one of the major factors deter-
mining the overall success of its new development prog-
rammes and plans. 
In this connection, Leopoldo Solis [22] has warned in 
1978 that inflation could cause exchange rate problems and 
thwart import substitution and export development, thereby 
hampering the goal of product diversification. Others [Bueno 
6, Laney 16] have pointed out that Mexico is determined 
not to repeat the mistakes of Iran and Venezuela. Venez-
uela has had a reasonably good price stability, but petroleum 
income has not been used successfully to institute lasting 
developmental changes in the economy, while Iran encoun-
tered high rates of inflation in the 1970s and failed to trans-
form the structure of its internal production. 
The nature of the Mexican inflation and the course of 
inflation related variables therefore merit considerable atten-
tion. In the analysis below, particular emphasis is given to 
inflation in the 1970s, with an attempt made to identify 
the type and source of the inflation experienced. 
THEORIES OF INFLATION 
The increase in the rate of inflation in the first half of 
the 1970s, together with the government's seeming inability 
to stabilize the price level dramatized the need for a deeper 
understanding of the country's inflationary process. Some-
thing of a debate concerning the precise cause of the rapid-
ly accelerating price level has transpired both within and out-
side of Mexico. For convenience, two extreme views on the 
country's inflationary process can be distinguished: the 
structuralist interpretation and the monetarist explanation. 
The Structuralist Position 
Structuralism was associated from the beginning with 
the more leftist writers, together with a number of the lead-
ing technocrats in the Ministry of Planning. As developed 
in Mexico, structuralism seems largely concerned with the 
examination of potential and actual conflicts between 
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growth, stabilization and equity - [e.g., Tello 23, C.I.D.E. 
7]. 
Structuralist ~tress has always been on disequilibrium and 
the notion that the country's inflation was inevitable once 
the government attempted rapid growth in the presence of 
structural bottlenecks or constraints. The chief assumption 
has been, therefore, that certain fundamental facets of this 
economic, institutional and socio-political organization of 
the country in one way or another acted to inhibit economic 
expansion [Fitzgerald 10, p.238]. 
One variant of the structuralist school suggests that the 
rapid industrial growth of the post-war years, far from being 
stable development, led to greater foreign penetration of the 
economy - worsening income distribution and sectoral im-
balance. These factors not only exacerbated social tensions 
but also led to a stagnation of the growth process. 
Based on this perspective, the Echeverria period is seen 
largely as one of attempting to get the economy out of this 
impasse by further state intervention in heavy industry, wage 
support and agrarian reform. In this, the Echeverria govern-
ment is felt to have been frustrated by the world crisis of the 
1970s and by the opposition of both the domestic and for-
eign banking system. As Tello notes: 
Critics forget that the deficiencies in economic policy were not in that 
which was implemented but rather in what was not: the restructuring of 
the financial, monetary and credit system so that it ceases to be the deter-
minant factor in national economic development (23, p.207]. 
Historically, the structuralist analysis has been concerned 
largely with the identification and examination of alleged 
structural constraints. While not always spelled out, these 
could be taken to include: 
1. the inelastic supply of foodstuffs; 
2. the infrastructure bottleneck; and 
3. the foreign exchange constraint [Gonzalez and Flores-
cano 11]. 
• In the structuralist view, inflation could not be stopped if 
these structural limitations were not eliminated. The cumula-
tive inflationary pressures were distortions generated by the 
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inflationary process itself which were an increasing function 
of the rate of inflation. The main cumulative factors were: 
1. distortions of the price system, mainly caused by the 
price control policies associated with inflation, and 
2. misallocation of resources, mainly investment funds 
[Mueller 17, pp.150, 153]. 
Along these lines, many structuralists contend that the 
country's inflation was inevitable, given the country's phase 
of transition from an outward oriented export based econo-
my to an inward oriented domestic market based economy. 
Such a transition, it was argued, required massive changes 
in the socio-economic structure of the country which the 
price mechanisms, operating within very imperfect market 
structures and with limited resource mobility, was unable to 
achieve-- i.e. given the imperfection of the system, the re-
sult of attempting major structural change was simply shor-
tages and disequilibrium on many fronts. 
In particular, the employment problem (in Tello and 
SPF) is seen as clearly dett:rmined by the low demand for 
labour generated by an industry based on foreign technolo-
gy, while the skewed income distribution produces a demand 
for luxury products based on this technology [Tello, 23]. 
Underemployment is seen, therefore, as a more critical pro-
blem than inflation [Fitzgerald 10, p.238). 
The attention to the composition of demand and the in-
fluence of industrial ownership means that this approach can 
be said to have made the transition from a Keynesian to a 
Kaleckian view of the world. This is strengthened by the 
recent detailed empirical attention to the process of price for-
mation through ,markups. on wages and imports by the CIDE 
group. 
Many structuralists see the most serious threat to price 
stability over the next few years as due to the existence of 
severe supply bottlenecks. Lagging agricultural production 
and the short supply of skilled human capital are the two 
most pressing problems. Alumium, cement, and oil refining 
capacities are reported to be full. Inadequate transportation 
and storage facilities may possibly be the most severe bottle-
necks. 
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The railway system still relies heavily on telegraphic 
communications, employs old locomotives, and must rely on 
a one track system that limits the number of runs. According 
to the director of the national railway system, the rail tracks 
needed to complete rehabilitation will take 18 years and 65 
billion pesos at current prices with. 23 billion pesos program-
med for 1980-1982 to improve them. He indicated that the 
system is short 1 SO new diesel-electric locomotives and that 
4,000 new cars will be needed each year [Bath 5, p.193] . 
Inadequate ports and rail transportation have led to an 
increase in highway use. In late 1979, in Baja California, mer-
chandise was delayed over 60 days because truck operators 
baulked at the prospect of an empty return run. Trucks 
waited for a month in Nuevo Laredo for import documents 
to be processed. At Coatzacoalcos, government agencies 
and larger companies were paying double or triple the offi-
cial trucking rates to hire trailers. Such gouging has led some 
producers such as pharmacuetical companies to withdraw 
some products from the market. Red tape limits the circu-
lation of trucks to specific areas and means loads have to be 
switched, adding up to 60 per cent to the cost [Bath S, 
p.193]. 
In this context, the term bottlenecks and the relation-
ship of bottlenecks to inflation must be clarified. Structural-
ist analysis has often been criticized [Kirkpatrick and Nixson 
14, p.132] as unsound because there is no reason, at least in 
theory, why an increase in the price of one commodity 
(i.e., a bottleneck) should raise the general price level and 
provoke an inflationary spiral. 
In an open economy, an increase in imports can keep 
prices constant and in a closed economy, neoclassical theory 
would predict that a rise in the relative price of one type of 
good (for example, beans) should lead to a shift in demand to 
other goods and a reallocation of the factors of production, 
leading to the restoration of an equilibrium position. But if 
the prices of manufactured goods are inflexible downwards, 
a rise in food prices (with other prices constant) raises the 
average price level. In turn, if industrial wages are tied to 
consumer prices, they will rise leading to an upward move-
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ment in industrial prices. The change in relative prices may be 
insufficient to lead to a shift in demand and thus an infla-
tionary spiral will develop [Kirkpatrick and Nixson 14, 
p.132). 
The Mexican inflation of the 1970s cannot be explained 
by structural factors alone. In addition, some sort of propaga-
ting mechanism had to be present to sustain price increases 
over such a long period of time. Here the structuralists are 
not particularly explicit. Mention is made of a struggle among 
different ·economic groups to improve their shares in total 
income. This manifested itself to a certain extent in conflicts 
between wage earners and profit earners. Secondly and pro-
bably more important, was the struggle between the private 
and public sectors to increase their share of real resources. 
Barkin and Esteva [ 3, 4] have developed a sociological 
view along these lines that views the overall price level as 
determined by the conflict between different social classes 
over the economic surplus. Successive attempts to maintain 
or increase wage and profit levels rather than the money 
supply or growth problems are seen by them as the prime 
cause of inflation. 
This line of argument is relatively novel in the Mexican 
context, but the author's case seems weakened by their lack 
of formal specification in their model [Fitzgerald 10, p.240] 
(particularly the effects of fiscal structures, the stability or 
otherwise of business markups, and the influence of external 
price levels). 
A further area of sociological contribution to the" infla-
tion debate has been in the analysis of entrepreneurial 
groups. Here some assumption must be made explicitly or 
implicitly about the strength of domestic industrial capital. 
The radical writers assume it to be a distorting influence 
while the more orthodox structuralists argue that capital is 
incapable of further unaided industrialization. Unfortunately, 
there has been relatively little empirical research on this 
topic. 
In sum, although a complete structuralist model has not 
previously been developed for Mexico, one can easily be con-
structed by incorporating a number of structural elements 
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into a general Brono-Chenery-Strout model. 
As an illustration, a structural inflationary process in the 
Mexican context could begin with a rapid expansion in eco-
nomic activity stemming from oil financed government in-
vestment in the industrial sector. Such an expansion should 
cut back under-employment generated over time by the static 
conditions in the agricultural sector and a moderately high 
population growth. 
In turn, increased incomes create an expanded demand 
for food, thus generating pressures in the agricultural sector. 
Due to the low price elasticity of supply in agriculture (a 
structural problem), however, substantial increases in relative 
prices in favour of the sector are necessary to clear the mar-
ket. Food shortages (at relatively stable prices) are aggrava-
ted by the fact that oil financed imports were already strain-
ing the country's port facilities and transport system. The 
result: imports of food and consumer products while capable 
of being financed out of oil revenues, could not increase 
rapidly enough to augment domestic supplies, thus main-
taining a relatively stable price level. 
If unemployed resources could have been productively 
moved to the industrial sector and if industrial prices had 
been flexible downward, a change in relative prices without 
inflation might have taken plac,e. However, because of the 
low mobility of most domestic resources and the inflexi-
bility of industrial prices (due to monopolistic positions en-
couraged by the, import substitution-industrial strategy), 
monetary expansion was required to generate prices high 
enough for the change in relative prices. 
In short, a structuralist interpretation of Mexico's infla-
tion would contend that domestic price increases stemmed 
largely from the inability of supply to adapt to a changing 
a:id growing level of demand. In the 1970s this problem was 
characterized by inelasticity and instability in agricultural 
output together with insufficient infrastructure facilities 
which precluded imports from aiding in adjustment to equili-
brium at relatively stable prices. 
• 
With these mechanisms in mind, a structuralist two-gap 
model [ Chenery 9] can be hypothesized for Mexico as 
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follows. If the Mexican authorities wanted to increase the 
rate of growth of real gross domestic prod11r.t from the his-
toric rate of 6 to 7 per cent, the econoi... vuld generate a 
foreign trade gap due to the inelasticity of import demand, 
a structural problem, together with fixed export revenues. 
Imports must increase because additional amounts of raw 
materials and capital goods would be required by the indus-
trial sector. The country's extremely underdeveloped tax sys-
tem would not be capable of absorbing the excess liquidity 
from the expanding consumer sector. The result (given the 
low propensity of most individuals to save) would be a gap 
between total domestic savings and investment greater than 
that between exports and imports. In these circumstances, 
inflation would most likely be the only }llechanism capable 
of facilitating an equilibrium adjustment between the domes-
tic (savings-investment) and external (export-import) gaps; 
i.e., inflation would result in savings increasing up to the 
point (through pricing individuals out of certain product mar-
kets) where the domestic (savings-investment) gap equalled 
the external gap. 
Structuralists, therefore, view inflation as emerging in the 
process of making the two gaps equal ex post. The actual 
adjustment process is achieved through two struggles for 
the available consumer goods: (i) that between wage earners 
and profit earners, and (ii) that between the private sector 
and the public sector. The ultimate distribution of income 
will oe determined by the relative strength of these groups. 
Using this framework, it is possible to quantify the nature 
of the overall constraints on the country's growth during the 
period under consideration. 
If imports are now defined to include net factor services, 
Y or Gross National Product is equal to 
(1) Y = C + I (X- M) [Landau 15, pp.299-321] 
Along with GNP two additional identities can be created: 
(2) Y = C + S and 
(3) F + I - S 
and from (1) with Y = GNP: 
F=M-X 
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It is now possible to estimate an ex post savings function of 
the form: 
S + al + blY + clF 
and an ex post import function of the form: 
M = a2 + b2Y = c2F 
Several possible constraints to the country's growth can now 
be identified within the context of the so-called two-gap ana-
lysis where GS equals the savings gap or (I - S), and GT 
equals the trade gap or (M - X). 
If the trade gap· had been a binding constraint on the 
country's growth during the period under consideration, an 
ex ante deficiency of (desired) foreign exchange would have 
existed in excess of required investment over potential sa-
vings for the level of income existing at the time. 
It can be shown that under these circumstances, the 
estimated coefficient cl in equation (2) above would assume 
a value between -1 and 0. 
On the other hand, if the savings gap had been binding, 
foreign capital would have implemented rather than acted as 
a substitute for domestic savings. 
In terms of the equilibrating process, it is unlikely that 
adjustments reflecting ex ante deficiencies in the two gaps 
would have been alleviated by changes in exports since ac-
tual exports could have fallen short of their potential only if: 
1) the goods and services exported could have been con-
sumed in significant amounts domestically. There were, 
of course, limitations on increased domestic oil usage, 
especially in the short run; and 
2) some imports required for producing exports could be 
employed in the production of goods for the internal 
market. Here the specialized nature of the oil industry 
and the limited range of areas to which the factors in 
this sector could be transferred in the short run preclud-
ed this type of adjustment in Mexico during the period 
under consideration. 
The constraints on exports facilitating an equilibrating 
role meant that increases in imports over their desired level 
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would have been the likely mechanism of adjustment in those 
years in which the saving gap was constraining the expansion 
in income. During those periods, actual and desired levels of 
savings would be equal, resulting in the estimated value of 
c 1 equalling zero. 
Again, the theoretical literature has demonstrated that if 
in fact imports exceeded their minimum required levels (in 
the presence of relatively abundant amounts of foreign ex-
change), estimates of c2 would yield a positive number. 
The above considerations can be used to derive a fairly 
precise method of identifying the nature of the macroecono-
mic constraints under which the Mexican economy operated 
during the 1951-82 period as a whole. Tests were also made 
for several sub-periods to see if there was any shift in the im-
portance of either the domestic or external constraints. As 
the model is constructed, a value of c 1 close to -1.0 together 
with a value of c2 not significantly different from 0.0 would 
imply that the trade gap posed the greatest hindrance to in-
creased output. 
On the other hand, if estimates of cl were close to 0.0 
and c2 was significantly positive, it is likely the savings gap 
had been binding. 
Finally, if estimates of cl were significantly negative (but 
with an absolute value less than unity), while. c2 were signifi-
cantly positive, the country probably experienced periods of 
alternative savings and trade constraints, with neither domin-
ating the period as a whole. 
The results indicate that for the 1962-1980 period as a 
whole, the trade gap was binding with cl = 0.35 (Table 1) 
and c2 small and insignificant. This pattern held fairly stead-
ily during the various sub-periods examined (1952-70; 1952-
75; 1966-80; 1961-80). 
Apparently, the government's attempts at mobilizing sa-
vings were successful in alleviating any constraint from that 
source. On the other hand, the presence of an over-valued 
exchange rate together with relatively high rates of income 
growth through most of the period •combined to create a 
relative shortage of foreign exchange. 
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COST THEORIES OF INFLATION 
The structuralist approach is largely of interest because 
it provides a useful framework for developing an integrated 
view of the country's inflationary process. Because it relies 
on such concepts as relative inelasticity (how inelastic does 
something have to be before it is relatively inelastic?), the 
theory is always open to criticism. Several indirect tests as 
the one above are possible, however, and with time a more 
complete empirical model will undoubtedly be constructed. 
A discussion and quantitative assessment of the impor-
tance of cost factors is much more straightforward. It should 
be noted, however, that any analysis of the cost-push origins 
of Mexican inflation will suffer from: (i) the limited availa-
bility of data, and (ii) the existing data's limitations. There 
is no consistent time series for wages, nor is there an impor-
tant price series. Further, the GDP deflater is so weighted 
by oil that it is of little value in analyzing the possible deter-
minants of domestic price increases. There is a cost of living 
index and a wholesale price index, but both of these mea-
sures are subject to serious defects; i.e., cost of living index 
is based on a limited sample of goods and services purchased 
in Mexico City, and is therefore unrepresentative of the con-
sumption patterns of the majority of the rural population, 
while the wholesale price index is heavily weighted with 
imports. 
Given the available data, two cost factors are examined: 
(1) world prices, and (2) wages. A structuralist element, 
the effects of deviations from the trend in real GDP on 
prices, is also examined. 
Movements In World Prices 
Given its size, it is safe to assume that Mexico's purchases 
and sales of non-oil goods in the world market had no effect 
on the prices of these goods; i.e., for all practical purposes, 
the prices of the country's non-oil exports and imports 
were determined by global demanq and supply conditions. 
For purposes of analysis, therefore, the U.S. dollar export 
and import prices of these goods can be taken as exogenous 
variables. Given these international prices, the export and im-
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port prices in rials were dependent on the peso/dollar rate. 
There are two channels by which nsrng import prices 
might induce domestic inflation: Firstly, the direct effect 
transmitted through the higher cost of domestic production 
of frnished products stemming from increases in the prices of 
imported raw materials. In terms of the second channel, the 
degree to which producers had little or no way of substitu-
ting for imported materials meant that there were few real 
possibilities (at least in modem industries) of switching from 
expensive imported goods to cheaper domestic sources of 
supply. 
The data on external sources of inflation for this period 
are somewhat limited. Nevertheless, several patterns seem 
fairly clear. A close examination of the actual fluctuations 
in the rate of inflation in the 1970s suggests a fairly close 
link between domestic prices and the movement of interna-
tional prices of food, raw materials, oil, and oil by-products. 
For example, the 1971-72 decline in the consumer price in-
dex appears linked in part to the reduction in international 
prices of foodstuffs and raw mat.erials taking place at that 
time. 
Similarly, the rise in the rate of inflation in 1973 and 
1974 was taking place while the international prices of raw 
materials and intermediate goods were rising. The sharp in-
crease in public sector prices and tariffs, particularly those on 
oil and oil by-products, no doubt added to the overall rise in 
the domestic price level. 
Of course, movements in international prices by them-
selves are not sufficient to explain the rising rate in Mexican 
inflation relative to those of its major countries. In terms of 
internal sources of inflationary pressure, both the decline of 
agricultural production and the slowing down in oil produc-
tion combined to accentuate the movements in international 
prices. 
Specifically, the rapid rise in the import prices of basic 
foodstuffs in 1973-74 coincided with a fall in domestic pro-
duction, thus increasing the import content of agricultural 
supplies, undermining the effectiveness of the government's 
agricultural prices policy designed to neutralize the effect 
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of the imported inflation. The Middle East oil crisis in 1973-
74 and the quadrupling of oil prices just happened to occur 
as the domestic oil industry was beginning to encounter 
difficulty meeting growing domestic demand. 
Also, given available data, it is ·1ery difficult to make 
any clear distinction between external and internal sources 
of inflationary pressure for intermediate inputs into manu-
facturing and construction. For sure, there is a relationship 
between the import price of building materials, the rise in 
domestic wholesale prices, and the increase in the cost of 
housing and housing rentals. A similar pattern between im-
port and domestic prices can be observed for textiles. For all 
of these items, it is apparent that both domestic and foreign 
sources of price increases contributed to the rise in Mexican 
wholesale and consumer prices. The domestic component of 
inflationary pressures corresponded generally in its timing 
to the expansion of consumer incomes, and for building ma-
terials, to the rapid expansion of expenditures in the con-
struction sector. 
At the aggregate level, recent empirical work on a large 
sample of countries suggests that there may be a possible 
relationship between the degree of national integration into 
the world economic system and inflation; i.e., in general, 
the more open countries have experienced less price inflation 
[lyoha 13, pp.31-38]. Presumably, openness serves as a kind 
of safety valve, domestic inflationary pressure spills over 
into the balance of payments in the open economy thus 
necessitating less price inflation. 
One way of testing for the effect of openness on domes-
tic inflation is to test various formulations of a price equa-
tion with measures reflecting the degree of contact with the 
world economy included as independent variables. Logical 
candidates in this regard are: (i) the country's import-income 
ratio; (ii) the rate of change in Mexico's import-income 
ratio; (iii) the country's terms of trade (the ratio of import 
prices to export prices); (iv) the rate of growth in the Mex-
can money supply; and (v) the rate of growth of Mexico's 
real gross domestic product. • 
lyoha [ 13, pp.31-38] - the originator of this test -- used 
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imports/GDP as an independent variable hypothesizing that 
a negative correlation between these two variables could be 
interpreted as evidence that inflationary pressures spill over 
into balance of payments, thus resulting in less domestic 
inflation than would have otherwise been the case. 
It has been argued [Akhatar 1; Kirkpatrick and Nixson 
14] that this mechanism is not a very accurate depiction of 
the mechanism at work in most developing countries where 
foreign exchange shortages pose a severe limit to the possi-
bility of absorbing potential inflationary pressures through 
increasing import surplus. The typical developing country 
may, therefore, not really have a choice between its rate of 
domestic inflation and its magnitude of balance of payments 
deficit; i.e., the rate of inflation may in part be determined 
by the foreign.exchange constraint. Mexico's borrowing capa-
city in the international financial markets would seem to rule 
out this problem for most of the period under considera-
tion. 
Since there is no real concensus in the literature as to 
the best way of measuring openness, the simple ratio of 
nominal imports (in the national income accounts - NAN) to 
nominal gross domestic product, GDP or K=ZNAN was 
used. 
Another independent variable (suggested by lyoha 
[ 13]) is the terms of trade. Due to lack of import and ex-
port unit value figures for Mexico, the terms of trade effect 
(Q) was defined as the United States export unit value 
index (International Monetary Fund Financial Statistics) 
divided by the Mexican wholesale price index (WPI) or 
Q = USE UV /WPI. 
Other independent variables included in the analysis 
were: (i) the deviation of real GDP from its historical trend 
(YDT); (ii) the rate of change of the terms of trade (GQ); 
(iii) the growth in Ml money and M 1 lagged (GM I, GM IL); 
and (iv) expected rate of inflation defined as last year's 
inflation minus that of the previous year (INFF), with in-
flation the rate of change in the gro~s domestic product 
deflator. 
A number of different combinations were tried with 
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the best results (Table 2) occuring when the various mea-
sures of openness were regressed simultaneously with : (i) the 
growth in the terms of trade (GQ); (ii) the rate of expected 
inflation (INFE); and (iii) the deviation from the trend 
(YDT). Regressions on the wholesale price index gave con-
sistently better but quite similar results to those of the con-
sumer price index. Hence, only the results obtained from the 
regressions with the rate of change in wholesale prices are 
presented. 
The value of K (openness measure) is significant and has 
the expected negative sign (-1). Caution should be observed 
in attributing a great deal of significance to the results, 
however, since the K measure is only slightly significant at 
the 95 per cent level. 
A plausible explanation of the negative relationship 
between GQ and the rate of inflation is that a substantial 
portion of imports during this period were required for in-
dustrialization; i.e., they did not represent a spillover effect 
'proper' from the domestic inflation. This type of import 
may have increased over time independent of changes in 
domestic prices. When a capacity constraint (YDT) was 
added to the regressions to take part of this effect into ac-
count, the GQ t value increased significantly. A possible 
explanation for this result is that on the margin, additional 
imports did in fact represent spillover imports to an extent 
great enough to overcome the positive effect of the price 
inelastic imports. 
This issue, while interesting and of some significance for 
policy design, was not pursued at length simply because 
several alternative (and somewhat competing) theories 
of the inflationary process in Mexico were found to be su-
perior from both a statistical and a theoretical point of 
view. 
Wage Increases 
A second potential ·source of cost pressures during this 
period may have been due to ~xcessive wage increases. Here 
it is wise to make a distinction between changes in the mini-
mum wage and other wage increases. 
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The Mexican Constitution itself specifically re'tognizes 
the right of workers to receive a sufficient wage to ensure 
their basic needs and provide their children with the educa-
tion to which they are entitled. Constitutional Article 123 
instituted the country's minimum wage (the lowest amount 
a worker can be paid for a day's labour). 
According to Mario de la Cueva, the idea of the minimum 
wage is to establish the minimum level in the social scale 
below which life loses the dignity and essence belonging to 
the human person. Accordingly, with the aim of guarantee-
ing full obtainment of the minimum wage, the Constitution 
provides that such earnings are not liable to discount, em-
bargo or compensation [ Schlagheck 20, pp.89-90]. 
Mexico's minimum wage refers to both general minimum 
wages and minimum professional wages, applied in skilled 
trades and fixed according to progress achieved in specific 
industrial branches - in commerce, professions or special 
trades and activities. The level set for this second group of 
wages and salaries is obviously higher than the general mini-
mum wage. Because the cost of living tends to be considera-
bly lower in rural areas than cities, the deputies drafting the 
Constitution provided that a different scale be established for 
rural workers. 
Minimum wages are fixed by regional commissions made 
up of labour, management and government representatives 
and require final approval by the National Minimum Wage 
Commission (set up along the same lines). Regional commiss-
ions are distributed throughout the country by socio-econo-
mic zones. Their geographic distribution is based on zones 
that aie supposedly reflective of natural, demographic, 
social, economic and cultural features, each of which is taken 
into account in determining the minimum wage for the par-
ticular zones. 
In 1963 there were 111 zones established for minimum 
wage enforcement. In September 1974, the National Mini-
mum Wage Commission's Council of Representatives, how-
ever, redistributed the zones more in keeping with the eco-
nomic, demographic, social, political and administrative 
changes that had taken place in recent years. As a result, the 
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number of zones fixed for wage setting purposes was cut to 
89 (thereby facilitating cost of living studies, family budget-
ing, and the other indicators periodically established by the 
National Minimum Wage Commission). 
In principle, the minimum wage is established after a 
consideration of : (i) cost of living measures; (ii) family 
budgeting (i.e. the aggregate of goods and services that 
covers the basic material and cultural necessities of a worker 
and his family); and (iii) an overall assessment of the coun-
try's economic conditions, of each zone in particular, of the 
structure of activities in each, and the behaviour of consumer 
markets. In conformity with the constitutional guidelines, 
minimum wages should be remunerative, adequate and fair; 
consequently, minimum wages and those established in coll-
ective contracts were originally revised every two years. 
One of the labour reform measures submitted to Congress 
in September 1974 argued that though the two-year period 
for wage revision is adequate in times of stability, it is far too 
long during periods of inflation. At that time, it was argued: 
(i) that most countries experiencing long periods of economic 
instability have created mechanisms that permit frequent 
adjusting of wages to the price level; (ii) that wage increases 
in times of inflation have acted to maintain both social 
stability and business growth in a number of countries at 
a similar stage of development as Mexico; and (iii) that un-
less wage adjustments are made on an annual basis, there 
would be a marked inconsistency between the Echeverria 
administration's wage policy and its policy for the equi-
table distribution of income progress. 
Based on these considerations, the Federal Labour Law 
was amended on 30 September 1974 with the proviso that 
minimum wages be fixed annually (starting 1 January of the 
following year) and that collective contracts would be re-
vised once a year (as of 1 May 1975). All other collective 
contract clauses were to continue to be renegotiated every 
two years. 
The decree of 24 September 1974 amending the Federal 
Labour Law empowers workers, labour unions, members of 
special labour boards, permanent Federal boards of concilia-
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tion, local boards of conciliation and labour inspectors to 
denounce before the competent authorities any employer 
paying his workers less than the minimum wage or who 
shows receipts for larger amounts than those actually paid 
out. The decree established jail sentences of three weeks to 
two years in all cases and fines up to two thousand pesos 
when the amount of the default did not exceed one month's 
minimum wage; five thousand pesos when the minimum has 
not been paid for two months; and ten thousand pesos when 
non-fulfillment extends over three months. However, if the 
employer pays back wages plus interest before the Public Pro-
secutor has reached a decision, punishment is limited to a 
fine. 
Labour leaders have come to use the minimum wage as 
a base for collective bargaining demands. In addition, fringe 
benefits have become more and more liberal, unionized wor-
kers have paid holidays, additional obligatory holidays such 
as May Day, a Christmas bonus of 15 days' pay, profit shar-
ing, social security, housing benefits, and various services 
like transport to work. Many labour leaders, privately con-
cede, however, that up to 80 per cent of rural workers and 
50 per cent of urban workers who should be receiving the 
minimum wage are not. Employers are easily able to ignore 
the law of the tremendous demand for jobs which has created 
a market overwhelmingly in their favour. There is no unem-
ployment insurance in Mexico. 
The actual trends in wages are difficult to analyze due to 
·a number 01 umuauv11::> rn we u11uenymg aata; only appro-
ximate estimates are possible. As measured by all wages in 
a sample of firms, average real wages grew by about 7 .5 per 
cent per year from 1960 through 1964; by about 2. 7 per cent 
per year from 1965 through 1970; and by about 3.6 per cent 
per year from 1971 through 1976. The annual rate for the 
period as a whole was about 4.2 per cent. 
The real minimum salary which some economists believe · 
to be a more accurate measure of trends in average wages 
grew slightly faster: 4.9 per cent per year over the period. 
Increases in fringe benefits further iricreased the real income 
of workers in the organized urban sector. Output per worker 
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in manufacturing grew somewhat faster than wages, at 5 to 7 
per cent per year. This productivity growth which is much 
faster than that observed in most countries may be mostly 
attributable to the shift to more capital intensive processes 
in a given sector. This shift is itself a result of the distorted 
factor prices. A smaller part of the productivity growth is 
due to a shift towards more capital intensive products. How-
ever, this shift has been small. 
More of the increase in real wages during 1971-76 occur-
ed in 1976. The annual increase had been under 2 per cent 
through 1975 (as measured by either the average wage in the 
same firms or average minimum wages); in 1976 the minim-
um wage rose 13 per cent, while average wages rose about 
16 per cent in real terms. (All these estimates are based on 
annual data, and thus approximate mid-year to mid-year 
changes.) The December to December increase in 1976 was 
even greater. From 1972 on, wages in Mexico rose relative to 
those in the United States, along with the increasing over-
valuation of the peso. Devaluation in 1976 brought the rela-
tive wage back to the level of the late 1960s. For the 1968-79 
period as a whole, real wages in Mexico seem to have risen by 
far more than in the United States. According to the Bank of 
Mexico figures [Banco de Mexico 2] , the real urban mini-
mum wage in Mexico was 27.1 per cent and the average real 
manufacturing wage 27.8 per ·cent above the 1968 level; 
while in the United States, the average real wage in private 
non-agricultural industries was 8.7 per cent above that level. 
According to the monthly data of the General Statistical 
Department, the Mexican real urban mmimum wage was 
32.6 per cent on 1 January 1978, and 39.7 per cent on 1 
January 1979 - above 1968; while in the United States, real 
manufacturing wage was on these dates 9.6 and 8.1 per cent 
rl!spectively - above the same base year. 
These comparative data on wages point to an increase in 
the Mexican cost structure as compared with that of the Uni-
ted States. The effort to keep up the purchasing power of 
wages appears to have led to excessive increases in money 
wages for those lucky enough to be employed and especial-
ly those protected by the minimum wage law and by the col-
lective wage contracts negotiated by the trade unions. 
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When the price level is changing so rapidly and relative 
prices are being distorted by the uneven increases in the 
prices of individual goods and services, partly the result of 
the discriminatory system of price control, measurement of 
the degree to which international competitiveness is being 
lost becomes very difficult. 
It is eary to see, however, that the environment during 
the 1970s would be conducive to increases in wages and earn-
ings - certainly in nominal terms, and possibly in real terms as 
well - in certain key sectors where demand was also expan-
ding rapidly. Even though extensive price controls were being 
introduced by the early 1970s, these were largely applicable 
to the basic foodstuffs area, and not the more dynamic man-
ufacturing sectors. Hence, one would prepict that the most 
rapid increases in wages and earnings would occur in the sec-
tors and industries in which ·employment was expanding most 
rapidly. Similarly, jobs requiring relatively higher levels of 
skill, given the relative shortage of trained manpower, should 
also have led to obtaining wage increases. Impressionistic 
evidence suggests that these were indeed the patterns pre-
dominating the country's labour markets where numerous 
accou,nts exist attesting to the hindrance to growth posed by 
shortages of skilled labour. 
On the wage side, the seventh day payment, tne 5 per 
cent INFONA VIT contribution, the vacation bonus, the one 
per cent education tax, and the 9 to 12 per cent social secur-
ity tax, the year end bonus, and the 8 per cent of profit 
sharing levy - all raised the cost of labour by as much as 50 
per cent. Moreover, the minimum wage itself tended to in-
crease labour costs above a free market level. For workers 
earning the minimum salary, these charges were borne com-
pletely by the employer (or by his customers if he could 
pass on the increased costs in the form of higher prices for 
his products). For workers earning above the minimum 
salary, however, a part of these charges may have been re-
flected in lower nominal wages. The result of the increased 
labour charges and the subsidies to equipment purchasing 
was that the cost of labour relative to the cost of equipment 
was perhaps twice what it would be in the absence of these 
measures. 
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Since these fringe benefits and the minimum wage were 
not available to many workers, distortions and inequities 
must have been created. Migration from rural to urban areas 
(always sensitive to wage differentials) was undoubtedly in-
creased by the higher wages available in cities. On the other 
hand, the higher labour costs borne by larger firms which 
had to pay these fringe benefits may have protected many 
smaller, informal enterprises (which did not pay them and 
thus were better able to compete). This last effect may have 
been important even if the smaller enterprises did not pro-
duce the same goods, because higher prices for products 
from larger enterprises may have shifted consumption to 
some extent to other products or services that were produced 
by informal enterprises or by individuals, and therefore had 
lower unit wage costs. 
Despite the increased real wage rates in some areas, it 
is fairly safe to tentatively conclude that wage cost push 
pressures did not dominate the inflationary process at this 
time. Indeed, wage increases contributed to the general rise 
in production costs. Other costs were rising equally or more 
rapidly, however. In the context of this period, it is appar-
ent that considerable reserves of unskilled labour existed 
both in the agricultural sector as urban employment at the 
beginning of the period. It. is hard to see, therefore, how in-
creased labour costs could have been anything but one as-
pect of the heavy demands increased expenditures placed 
on all productive resources. There is little evidence to supp-
ort the singling out of labour as a significant contributor to 
cost push forces, not least because of the absence of strong 
labour unions. 
In sum, while a case could perhaps be made for the exis-
tence of a wage cost push mechanism in the manufacturing 
and construction sectors, it is difficult to see how as an em-
pirical matter this effect could have dominated the infla-
tionary process in these sectors, let alone the economy as a 
whole. 
Profit Sharing 
A variant of the wage cost mechanism is one involving 
Origins of Mexican Inflation 189 
potential increases in mark-ups due to the country's profit 
sharing formulas. 
The National Commission on Profit Sharing met for the 
first time in 1963. At that time the Commission ruled that 
the workers' share of net company profits, less deductions 
for income tax, "reasonable interest on capital", and "pro-
fit reinvestment" was placed at 20 per cent. 
Experience in applying these guidelines together with 
changes taking place in the national economy during this 
time soon made it clear that a number of revisions in the ori-
ginal profit sharing plan were necessary. Changes in the plan 
were also indicated in light of the findings of a number of 
independent studies on the reforms made in fiscal and labour 
legislation, revealing the urgent need to update the profit 
sharing system. 
Accordingly, a second Commission was created which, on 
14 October 1974, placed the workers' share at 8 per cent of 
the net company profits (before the deductions stipulated in 
the former decree). The previous arrangement had reduced 
the share to 6 per cent of profits before income tax payment. 
A 1975 amendment to Mexico's labour legislation estab-
lished federal norms for corporate compliance with the pro-
fit sharing obligation. The new law together with Mexico's 
law defines profits or taxable income in a broad way, exclud-
ing only pension fund earnings, dividends received from Mexi-
can companies, and certain gains from the exchange or sale 
of corporate securities. It is this 8 per cent of all other in-
come that must be shared with employees. 
The provision that profit on sharing be determined on the 
basis of taxable income would seem to facilitate better con-
trol over the sums the workers actually receive and enable 
them to know and exercise the right more directly. Presum-
ably, the new rates are set to leave sufficient margin for 
... 
profit reinvestment (thereby stimulating the creation of new 
jobs) while curbing the trend toward intensive use of capital 
encouraged by the previous system (which allowed larger 
deductions in sharable profits in proportion to capital inten-
sity). 
In fact, the 1974 Commission ruled that the deductions 
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provided in the previous system for "reasonable interest on 
capital" and "profit reinvestment" were technically unjusti-
fiable inasmuch as business and industrial enterprises do not 
earn interest but profits. The position of the Commission 
appears to reflect the view that company growth rates are 
not dependent on profit reinvestment (since this type of ex-
pansion can be financed through the stock market, the issue 
of industrial mortgage bonds, and bank credit). 
In terms of the division of profits to be shared, the 8 per 
cent portion of taxable profits is divided and then distributed 
in two equal parts - i.e., 50 per cent of the 8 per cent lump 
sum is distributed among· employees on the basis of the 
number of days worked by each during the year. The remain-
ing 50 per cent is distributed according to the salaries earned 
by each. 
To administer the profit sharing process, the government 
has created a number of boards composed of an equal num-
ber of management and labour representatives. These bodies 
determine the specific profit share of each worker. Any dis-
pute at the board level is referred to the area labour inspec-
tor. The final amounts determined by the boards (or inspec-
tors) must be posted at each establishment and subsequently 
paid to employees no later than 60 days after the date on 
which annual income tax is due .. Workers who object in any 
way to their allotments can submit a claim to Mexico's 
income tax authorities for federal review. Seldom, how-
ever, is this grievance procedure exercised or redress warran-
~ed. Thus, profit sharing is a long and well established prac-
tice in Mexico. 
It should be noted that the right to share in corporate 
profits does not entitle workers to intervene in any way in 
the administration of their companies. 
One major criticism of the profit sharing plans centers 
around the programme's inflationary impact. In fact, local 
businessmen report that profit sharing results in large per-
iodic lump sum increases in purchasing power which are 
usually spent on durable goods, appliances, automobiles, 
homes, etc. This etiective demand for goods could presum-
ably be sustained dunng inflationary periods despite the go-
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vernment's efforts to control price increases through tighten-
ing consumer credit [Schlagheck 20, pp.94-95]. 
It would seem, therefore, that profit sharing would, if 
anything, impact on inflation through some sort of demand 
pull mechanism rather than through the cost push pressures 
under consideration here. 
DEVIATIONS FROM THE TREND AS A MEASURE 
OF INFLATIONARY PRESSURE 
A proxy measure of the general level of bottlenecks, 
strains, and ultimately, structural inflationary forces is some 
measure of the deviation of production from its long run 
trend. This approach assumes that: 
1) short run deviations of output from its long term trend 
are an adequate measure of the inflationary pressure; 
2) the monetary authorities either cannot or do not neu-
tralize the impact of changes in holdings of foreign exchange 
on the money supply [Otani 14, pp.750-74]. 
As later analysis will show, the second assumption is 
open to some question. For now, however, several formula-
tions of the general type: 
INFW = YDT + WINF + INFWE + other variables 
were estimated. Here, INFW is a measure of domestic infla-
tio12 (wholesale prices); YDT is a measure of the deviation of 
real production from its long run trend; WINF is the rate of 
increase in world prices; and INFWE is a measure of price 
induced expectations - i.e., the Harber measure of expected 
inflation as the rate of inflation this year minus the inflation 
rate last year. 
In direct contrast to a quantity of money type price 
equation (which takes Y as given in the short run), this for-
mulation incorporates a growing body of literature con-
tending that (at least in the short run) the level of real out-
put in developing countries is subject to the influence of 
domestic policy measures (such as money supply changes) 
[ Sheehey 21, pp.68-79]. Whereas in a quantity of money 
equation at a given level of income, money supply changes 
are the measure of excess demand, the above formulation 
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implies that shifts in money supply will affect prices only 
if they cause output to rise above its long term trend. 
Obviously, the major empirical issue surrounding this 
approach is the ability of YDT to serve as an effective mea-
sure of excess demand. If D does not properly account for 
this factor, and because the various determinants of infla-
tion tend to some degree to rise together, an undue share 
of the variation of the prices of home goods may be attri-
huted to import prices and the lagged price changes used in 
the expectations variable. 
With these caveats in mind, a number Qf regressions of 
the above general form were run. As with the test of the 
openness inflation theory, regressions on the rate of increase 
in the wholesale price index gave somewhat better statisti-
cal (but similar) results compared with the consumer price 
index. 
Again, because the literature is not precise as to the 
best aggregate income measure to use in deviations from the 
trend analysis, several different income series were tested. 
A logarithmic form was estimated along with the regular 
formulation (linear regression of real GDP in time). 
Also tested was a measure computed as the difference 
between the observed growth rat.e in real GDP and that of 
the average (8.87) for the 1951-1980 period as a whole 
(GOT). 
The best statistical results were obtained with the mea-
sure of the deviation from the trend as that of the linear 
time trend (YDT). Using this measure, deviations from the 
trend ( 1951-1980) together with world inflation (WINF) and 
the growth in Ml money (equation 9, Table 3), a r2 of over 
0.90 was obtained. 
As noted in the discussion of openness and inflation, 
all measures of openness were quite significant when regres-
sed with YDT. These results are presented in that section. 
Again, the rate of world inflation (WINF) is significant 
when regressed with YDT as is the grt>wth in M2 and Ml 
measures of money and their lagged values. As in the test 
for openness, the expected rate of inflation, INFWE, was 
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significant in each regression tested. Results with the rate of 
consumer price increases were similar (Table 3), but not as 
statistically satisfactory. 
While these results seem quite satisfactory, several con-
ceptual difficulties detract somewhat from their acceptance. 
While these results seem quite satisfactory, several con-
ceptual difficulties detract somewhat from their acceptance 
as an accurate depiction of the inflationary process in Mexico 
during this period. 
In general, at least three characteristics of the Mexican 
economy might limit the effectiveness of YDT as a measure 
of excess demand: (i) the high proportion of agriculture pro-
ducts in both production and consumption; (ii) a fairly high 
rate of inflation; and (iii) an uneven growth of productive 
capacity. 
Implicit in the use of YDT as a measure of excess demand 
in the inflation equations is the notion that when the growth 
of output rose above its long run trend the country's domes-
tic productive capacity was being strained, and that prices 
had to rise if output was to be increased any further. Clearly, 
this assumption is predicated on the existence of an upward 
sloping supply curve of output, whereby increasing prices 
stimulate further production. This situation is undoubtedly 
more suited for conditions present in the more advanced 
economies where gross domestic product has a much higher 
proportion of industrial products. In general, there should be 
more scope for expanding the output of manufacturing and 
services in the short run than would be the case for agricul-
tural products, particularly as in Mexico where most products 
were subject to a crop cycle or weather conditions. Even 
though import substitution industrialization was proceeding 
rapidly, GDP was still heavily concentrated on agricultural 
products even in the 1970s. Given the rapid expansion in 
the consumption of food during this period, agriculture's 
output was probably more subject to fluctuations in domes-
tic supply than in domestic demand. Conceivably, short run 
deviations of agricultural production above its trend could re-
sult in lower rather than higher prices and vice versa, thus 
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distorting the measure of excess demand which the overall 
deviation from the trend figure was attempting to capture. 
A second limitation on the usefulness of YDT as a mea-
sure of excess demand is its implicit assumption that produc-
tive capacity grows at a fairly constant rate. While investment 
fluctuates from year to year in most advanced countries, 
Mexico's investment, particularly private investment, seems 
to have been especially volatile by any standards. 
Whether these fluctuations in capacity are high enough to 
invalidate the YDT measure of excess demand is difficult to 
assess. They do, however, cast serious doubts on the proce-
dure. 
Finally, applicability of YDT as an accurate measure of 
demand pressure in Mexico is also questioned because of 
the country's high rates of inflation and money supply 
growth, particularly in the 1970s. Within a limited range, 
changes in short run demand pressure could have resulted 
partially in higher industrial output and partially in price 
increases. Nevertheless, a point may have been realized in the 
early 1970s beyond which an increase in demand resulted in 
higher prices only. The high rates of money supply growth 
combined with a high proportion of output in agriculture 
may have been sufficient to have significantly reduced the 
economy's short run supply ~lasticity. 
CONCLUSION 
Taken in their entirety, the empirical results presented 
above cast doubt on the role of pure cost push factors as a 
significant contributing factor to Mexico's inflation during 
the period under consideration. Admittedly, these may have 
been present in certain industries and certain times, but their 
overall impact seems to have been minimal. The structural-
ist interpretation of inflation would seem to be on much 
sounder ground. In fact, it might even be argued that in the 
medium term, the development of industry through the 
country's import substitution strategy further added to dom-
estic inflationary pressures. High levels of protection affor-
ded new industries from world competitions turned the dom-
estic terms of trade Sharply against agriculture in the 1960s 
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and 1970s, thus reducing the rate of growth of agricultural 
output below what it would otherwise have been. (The lack 
of investment in agriculture further exacerbated this pro-
blem.) 
It is also likely that the industrialization that did take 
place aggravated or even created a number of rigidities 
that began to characterize the economy in the 1970s - i.e., 
the inadequacy of infrastructure created by the sudden 
demand placed on power and transport by the stepped up 
level of government expenditures. Similarly, the short term 
inadequacy of labour - both skilled labour and industrial 
entrepreneurs - was created by excessive industrial growth. 
Ultimately, the issue comes down to the fact that the test 
outlined above using proxies for structural factors, while 
statistically satisfactory, suffers from conceptual difficulties. 
Specifically, many of the underlying assumptions critical for 
the validity of the deviation from the trend measure may not 
have been present in Mexico dunng the period examined. 
The real issue is whether or not, given the limitations of these 
theories, the quantity of money (or a version of it) approach 
- given the availability of direct data for its testing - might 
not give a better idea of the relative inflationary impact of 
external versus domestic factors. 
Monetary elements also warrant more attention simply 
because in tests with structural factors, the growth in money 
supply was always statistically significant. The importance of 
this lies in the fact that in responding to inflation, the govern-
ment appears to have implicitly accepted the argument that 
its underlying causes were cost related and not of monetary 
origins. 
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